外文翻译对象技术

外文翻译对象技术（精选4篇）

1.外文翻译对象技术 篇一

Agricultural Land and Regulation in the Transition Economy of Russia Ekaterina Gnedenko1 & Michael Kazmin2 Published online: 7 July 2015 # International Atlantic Economic Society 2015 JEL Classification C10.L33.O57.Q00 This research note explores the link between farmland conversion and existing land regulation in Russia.We conclude that land regulation is lagging the new market trends in the transition economy of Russia.As market forces continue to penetrate the economy, apparent managerial and statutory problems with regard to local land-use planning and regulation preclude more effective use of land.Responding to the need for attracting investment in agriculture, the Russian Ministry of Science and Education provided funds for our research project that involves primary data collection and econometric analysis of the interdependencies between governmental policies and farmland loss.Our unique dataset contains socioeconomic, demographic and spatial geographic 2010 data for 39 municipal districts in the Moscow metropolitan region.The econometric analysis of this data set is used to explore the relationship among farmland quantity, its assessed value, the share of privatized farmland, farmland tax,and land-use zoning in the simultaneous equations framework.While the Russian market for real estate has developed quickly, the market for agricultural land is still thin.Farmland deals are limited, partly because of the lingering uncertainty about farmland property rights.The state-owned farmland is still significant.Our Moscow regional data suggest a strong positive relationship between the fraction of privatized farmland and farmland acreage, although the fraction of individually and collectively privatized farmland is only 57 %.The direct sale of farmland to foreigners is prohibited decreasing potential foreign investment as well.As a result, the area occupied by agricultural lands has been steadily decreasing and deteriorating in quality.During the period 1990 to 2005, tillable lands in Russia have shrunk by 10.5 million hectares(7.9 % of tillable lands).Lacking experience and adequate knowledge, local governments are stuck with the land conservation policies available to the former USSR.In particular, in an attempt to contain the loss of prime farmland, the regulators retain old land-use zoning laws prohibiting the change of land status.However, strong development pressures and widespread corruption often annihilate the desirable effect of zoning.The results of our econometric analysis indicate that the proximity to Moscow city and population growth both have a significant negative effect on the amount of farmland, even in the strictlyzoned-for agriculture districts, suggesting strong urban pressure in the capital region of Moscow.The estimated elasticity of farmland acreage with respect to population growth is −0.3.A corrupt practice of illegal changes in land status is reflected in the fact that the lands still classified as farmland in the Federal Register of Land are turned into residential or industrial areas.This signals a management problem which could be perhaps resolved by the introduction of more flexible zoning and an increase in the range of responsibilities of local governments and their property rights to land.The other economic instrument indispensable in land policy, land assessment, is also based on the former practices of the Communist period following a federally mandated general formula that takes into account soil productivity criteria, topographic features of the landscape, and the presence of irrigation, but still has little in common with the market price of farmland.When the agricultural land tax is calculated as the percentage of the assessed value of farmland, which is often below its real market value, local authorities are not interested in developing local agricultural infrastructure or increasing agricultural land base because they will not be able to reap any significant tax benefits from it.Coupled with the low federally mandated upper limits on tax rates(0.3 % of the assessed value of agricultural and residential lands)this leads to insufficient local tax revenues and overreliance on intergovernmental transfers.According to our data for the Moscow region, although localities tend to impose the maximum allowable tax rate, the average share of land tax revenues in local budgets is a mere 5 %.It is not surprising as the average assessed value of farmland across municipalities is 1000 times less than the ongoing average sales price, according to data we collected.The insignificant local land tax revenues caused by the underestimated land value lead to insufficient local infrastructure investment, which further suppresses the value of farmland and hastens its conversion.The results of the econometric analysis indicate lack of statistical significance between the assessed value of farmland and farmland quantity in the Moscow region, making the farmland tax rate an ineffective instrument in land policy.This missing link between the farmland quantity and existing land policies may render these policies not just ineffective but even wasteful.Innovative approaches such as the retention of development rights by the government might represent a temporary solution.The increasing reliance on local governance in solvinglocal problems would imply improved land-use and public finance planning and,perhaps, a slower farmland conversion trend.俄罗斯经济转型中的农业用地与监管

Ekaterina Gnedenko1 & Michael Kazmin2。在线出版:2015年7月7日。国际大西洋经济学会2015。冻胶分类C10。L33。O57。Q00 本研究报告探讨了俄罗斯农地转换与现有土地规制之间的关系。我们的结论是，土地监管滞后于俄罗斯转型经济的新市场趋势。由于市场力量继续渗透经济，在地方土地利用规划和管理方面显然存在管理和法律问题，妨碍了更有效地利用土地。为了应对吸引农业投资的需要，俄罗斯科学和教育部为我们的研究项目提供了资金，该项目涉及对政府政策和农田损失之间相互依赖关系的主要数据收集和计量分析。我们独特的数据集包含社会经济、人口和空间。2010年莫斯科都市地区39个市辖区的地理数据。通过对该数据集的计量分析，探讨了在联立方程框架下，耕地数量、其评估值、私有化耕地占比、农地税和土地利用区划之间的关系。

虽然俄罗斯房地产市场发展迅速，但农业用地市场仍很薄弱。农田交易是有限的，部分原因是土地产权的不确定性挥之不去。国有农田仍然很重要。我们的莫斯科地区数据显示，私有化耕地和耕地面积的比例之间存在着强烈的正相关关系，尽管单独和集体私有化耕地的比例仅为57%。禁止向外国人直接出售农田，也禁止减少潜在的外国投资。因此，农地占用的面积一直在稳步下降，质量也在不断恶化。在1990年至2005年期间，俄罗斯的可耕种土地减少了1050万公顷(占耕地面积的7.9%)。

由于缺乏经验和足够的知识，地方政府只能依靠前苏联提供的土地保护政策。特别是，为了遏制主要农田的流失，监管机构保留了禁止改变土地状况的旧土地用途分区法。然而，强大的发展压力和广泛的腐败往往会消灭分区制的理想效果。我们的计量分析结果表明，靠近莫斯科城市和人口增长对农田的数量有显著的负面影响，即使是在严格的农业地区，这表明莫斯科的首都地区的城市压力很大。在人口增长方面，耕地面积的估计弹性为0.3。非法改变土地状况的一种腐败做法，反映在土地仍然被归为联邦土地登记册上的土地的土地被转变为住宅或工业区的事实。这标志着一个管理问题，也许可以通过引进更灵活的分区和增加地方政府的责任范围和土地的财产权来解决。

其他经济工具不可或缺的土地政策、土地评估,也是基于前实践后共产主义时期的联邦法律规定的一般公式,考虑土壤生产力标准,地貌景观的灌溉的存在,但仍然没有与市场价格的农田。农业土地税计算时的评估价值的百分比农田,这通常是低于其实际市场价值,当地政府发展当地的农业基础设施不感兴趣或增加农业用地基地,因为他们将无法获得任何重大税收优惠。再加上联邦政府规定的低税率(占农业和居住用地评估价值的0.3%)，这将导致当地税收收入不足，并过度依赖政府间转移。根据我们对莫斯科地区的数据，虽然地方倾向于征收最高允许的税率，但地方预算的土地税收收入的平均份额仅为5%。据我们收集的数据显示，由于各城市的农田平均分摊价值比目前的平均销售价格低1000倍，这并不令人惊讶。

由于土地价值被低估而导致的地方土地税收不显著，导致地方基础设施投资不足，进一步抑制了农田价值，加快了土地流转。经济计量分析结果表明，在莫斯科地区，耕地和耕地数量的评估价值缺乏统计意义，使得农地税率在土地政策中是无效的。耕地数量和现有土地政策之间缺失的联系可能使这些政策不仅无效，甚至是浪费。政府保留发展权利等创新办法可能是一种临时解决办法。在解决地方问题上日益依赖地方治理，将意味着改善土地利用和公共财政规划，也许还会减缓农地转换的趋势。

2.外文翻译对象技术 篇二

1 翻译是一种跨文化活动

学者们普遍认为, 翻译不仅是一种语言活动, 更重要的是, 它是一项跨文化活动。语言是动态发展的, 语言不但反映文化, 也表现透过语言认识世界的说话人的个性。乔姆斯基认为翻译就是“再解码”, 就是转换语言的表层结构以反映其深层结构。语篇在多大程度上是可译的, 要视它与所在文化结合程度而定。文化与行为或行动、事件活动直接发生关系。文化依赖社会期待和规范, 其中既包括社会行为规范也包括语言用法上的规范。费米尔认为翻译主要是跨文化转换, 翻译是一种跨文化的活动, 是一种交际行为, 而非译码行动, 既可以发生在文化关系密切的语言之间, 也可以发生在文化关系疏远的语言之间。文化是具有独特性的, 不同国家的文化是互不相同的, 而不同国家人们的思维方式差异、文化习俗差异、地域文化等的不同都不同程度地影响和制约着翻译行为。因此, 在翻译中, 如何处理文化因素便成为译者十分重要的任务。

跨文化交际即指不同文化背景的人们之间的交际。也就是说, 所谓跨文化交际, 实际上是包含了许多不同的维面, 如跨种族交际、跨民族交际、同一主流文化内不同群体之间的交际、国际性的跨文化交际等等。人们用语言进行交际, 不但要讲究言语的正确性, 而且要考虑语言的得体性和可接受性。在交际活动中, 应根据交际的目的、对象和场合, 结合其文化背景、语言习惯对所用词汇、句式等做出正确的选择。正如托马斯 (Thomas) 指出:“语法错误从表层上就能看出, 受话者很容易发现这种错误。这种错误一旦发现, 受话者便会认为说话者缺乏足够的语言知识, 因此可以谅解。语用失误 (跨文化交际中, 交际的双方因不能进入同一文化背景之中, 所产生的语言词句与其使用之间的失误) 却不会被象语法失误一样看待。如果一个能说一口流利外语的人出现语用失误, 他很可能会被认为缺乏礼貌或不友好。他在交际中的失误便不会被归咎于语言能力的缺乏, 而会被归咎于他的粗鲁或敌意。”

语言就像一面镜子, 反映着独特的民族文化。翻译不仅是语际转换, 更是一种跨文化转换。字典里所包含的对应的翻译只是翻译的表层, 而丰富的文化信息则是潜藏在独特的文化底蕴之中,

例如:It opened to reveal a small, slightly stooped, demure man, smartly but modestly dressed, who welcomed me in and offered me a seat.

译文:门开了, 站在我面前的是个衣着朴素得体, 略微有些弓背, 神情庄重的小老头。他热情地迎我进门, 给我让座。

译者对“smartly”的第一反应是“洁净, 得体的”。其实, “smartly”还有别的含义。Smartly:1.in a strikingly neat and trim manner;2.leading the fashion style. (Concise Oxford Dictionary) 原文的这个“小老头”其实是著名的作家E.M.Forster。经查证, E.M.Forster是gay, 对于衣着又十分讲究, 爱穿亮色服饰, 打扮时髦但得体, 不夸张。所以, 我们不难看出这里的“smartly”应该取第二个含义, 翻译成“时髦的”。大多数字典里不可能把每个单词所联想的深厚的文化内涵所体现出来, 而外语学习者最开始接触的翻译也仅仅停留在意思表面即对应的字面意思。

再看另外一个例子:

Our eye contact was intermittent but potent.

译文:眼神交流虽然不多但却坚定有力。

译者对“potent”的第一反应是“坚定有力的”。字典上Potent的含义:1.having great power or influence;2.producing or capable of producing a desired result.译者显然只知道第一个意思 (第一义项) , 于是就把这一意思搬到译文中, 造成读者困惑。眼神交流怎么能说是“坚定有力”呢?联系上下文, 显然, 这里应该选取字典中的第二个意思, 翻译成“意味深长的”。

因此, 为了消除不同文化背景人们之间的误解, 了解与掌握字典里背后的深层文化底蕴是极其必要的。而翻译教学作为以双语的转换为主要内容的学科对文化传播更负有直接的责任。跨文化交际意识的培养对于翻译教学具有比对一般外语教学更为重要的意义。

2 跨文化活动中影响翻译的文化因素

众多因素影响着跨文化交际能力, 通过学习、了解和研究, 笔者分析了在跨文化活动中, 中国与英美国家文化规约和语言规约的差异, 即经常会出现交际障碍的几个主要方面:

1) 文化背景差异。不同文化背景之下, 人们的思维方式、思维习惯、语言表达方式、喻体、宗教信仰等各有差异, 而人们在交际中具体接触另一文化时, 往往容易潜意识地把强烈的本族语习惯和交际模式迁移至不熟悉的外国文化中去, 忽视了以上差异性, 从而导致相互误解及交际受阻。比如英美等国称自己是上帝的儿女, 中国人称自己是炎黄子孙, 是龙的传人。龙在中国文化中象征着神圣、强大、权力至上等, 而在西方人眼里, 龙是又凶又丑陋的怪物。西方人会说自己是一个“lucky dog” (幸运儿) , 在西方文化中, 狗是忠诚的朋友, 是家庭中的重要成员;而对于中国人而言, “狗”常被比喻成讨厌的人。

2) 思维方式差异。中方是发散性思维, 语言概述性强, 抽象性强, 注重整体;西方则是直线性思维, 强调逻辑分析, 具体性强, 重视个体。例如在时间的表述上, 汉语是以年月日的顺序, 而英语却是把年放在了最后。在价值观上, 中方重儒家文化, 集体主义, 中国人在面对表扬时, 语言上常表现的是谦虚, 否定自己;西方强调个人主义, 坦然接受表扬, 表现个人的成绩。

3) 教学内容差异。目前翻译资格证的考试还是重翻译技巧及语法知识, 文化与交际的知识考核得较少。通常教学的目的是取得了翻译资格证就能胜任翻译工作, 而没有提供条件让学生接受真实文化语境下的学习。在翻译教材方面, 呈现出单一、过时等特点, 缺乏实用性, 而且教材把重点过多地放在语言知识和具体的翻译技巧运用上, 设计的课堂内容对跨文化的引导和运用更是被忽略了。

3 科技资料翻译应注意的几个问题

3.1 注重表达习惯, 避免文化误读

科技文章具有“严谨周密, 概念准确、逻辑性强、行文简练、重点突出、句式严整”等特点, 文章中有大量的专业术语, 如果不了解翻译中的文化差异, 就会出现语用失误。当代英国译学理论家苏珊.巴斯内特 (Bassnett) 评论说“如同在做心脏手术时医生不能忽略心脏周围的肌体一样, 译者在翻译时也不能将文本的语言和文化分开来处理。”由此看来, 翻译不仅是语言的翻译, 更是文化的翻译, 译文是在不同的语言文化参照系中完成的。例如科技文章中经常使用被动语态, 而我们在翻译的时候, 就要注意不同表达习惯的差异, 如:The engine has been given a constantly good performance.如果直译成“这台发动机一直给出好的性能”, 显然不符合汉语的表达习惯, 可以译为“这台发动机一直工作很好”。

3.2 科技术语的汉译

术语是表示某一专门概念的词语, 科技术语就是在科技方面表示某一专门概念的词语。科技术语的特点是词义丰富, 专业性强, 这就要求翻译人员要有相关的专业知识, 翻译时必须根据专业内容谨慎处理, 稍不注意就会出现错误, 例如:对于“All the various losses, great as they are, do not have any contradict with the law of conservation of energy.”一句的翻译, 如果译成“所有这些各种各样的损失, 虽然很大, 但并不是和能量守恒定律矛盾的”, 虽然语法上没有错误, 但只要稍有一点科技知识的人都知道能量守恒定律是无条件的, 没有认任何形式的损失能违背这一规律。所以正确的翻译应为“所有这些各种各样的损失, 虽然很大, 但和能量守恒定律没哟任何矛盾”。

4 科技英语中倍数增减 (包括比较) 的汉译

科技英语中倍数增减句型究竟应当如何汉译, 在我国翻译界中一直存在争论, 倍数在英汉表述和理解上容易发生偏差, 造成误译。科技翻译涉及倍数关系时, 理解错误必然造成翻译错误, 造成企业经济上的损失, 有时可能是巨大的损失。臂如, 我们常常见到的“n times+形容词/副词比较级+than”这个句型, 其正确的理解为“比…… (大、高、重、多) n-1倍”。然而, 有不少翻译工作者理解为“比…… (大、高、重、多) n倍”。例如Sound travels nearly three times faster in copper than in lead.有人翻译成“声音在铜中传播的速度几乎比在铅中快三倍”。这句译文是错误的。应该译为“声音在铜中传播的速度几乎比在铅中快两倍”。

5 对译者的专业培训

5.1 选择恰当的教材

翻译教材是开展教学活动实现翻译教学目标的重要依据, 对翻译活动具有导向作用。国内翻译教材层出不穷, 种类繁多, 数量可观, 但缺乏文化交流为主线。跨文化意识较强的译者往往会选择融翻译技巧、翻译理论、翻译史、文化交流等为一体的教材。

5.2 强调广泛的课外阅读

在进行翻译训练的同时, 应提倡广泛的辅助课外阅读, 一方面通过大量的文学作品的阅读来了解一个民族的风俗习惯、社会关系、语言表达方式等文化以及该民族的宗教信仰、心理状态、气质等方面, 培养文化意识, 提高文化素养。另一方面, 还可以阅读一些如人类学、社会语言学、跨文化交际学、圣经、希腊神话等方面的书籍, 增强文化内涵。

5.3 加强主体文化意识的培养

科技翻译不仅要求译者具有扎实的汉语语言功底, 而且要有较强的语言应用能力, 同时还要有专业的科技知识, 因此, 在翻译教学中, 还要注意强化母语文化意识, 加强科技文章写作特点、用词风格、翻译技巧、翻译方法的培训, 有计划、有针对性、系统地阅读有关中国文化的报刊和书籍, 不断丰富语言知识和知识结构, 从而能有效、准确、得体地进行各种交际活动。

5.4 完善考核评价制度

目前我国翻译类课程的考核方式基本上是闭卷, 考试多是对语言知识点和翻译技巧的考核, 内容绝大部分是字词到段落的英汉互译, 主观论述题基本不会出现, 也不允许带字典等工具书。而在实际的跨文化交际中, 有翻遍所有字典也可能查不到的东西。因此, 在考核中, 可以加大平时成绩的力度。鼓励译者多搜集英语国家的文化知识或多找机会亲身体验跨文化交际, 并让译者在课堂上做口头翻译, 或者用角色扮演把一些典型的跨文化交际失误再现出来, 将此类形式的成绩纳入评价标准。

英语教学的根本目的是为了实现跨文化交际, 提高英语沟通应用能力。翻译承担着跨文化交际的重任, 因此, 在教学中不能局限于翻译方法的讲授, 更应该鼓励译者明确语言与文化的密切关系, 有计划、有系统地导入跨文化交流因素, 逐渐改变传授一般翻译技巧或机械练习的传统教法, 培养译者从文化内涵来分析作品, 理解作品。将不同国家的生态文化、社会文化和宗教文化等文化因素导入翻译教学中, 只有这样才能根本上提高翻译人员的翻译能力和实际交流能力。

参考文献

[1]杨平泽.非英语国家的英语教学中的文化问题[J].国外外语教学, 1995 (1) :22-23.

[2]陈舒.文化与外语教学的关系[J].国外外语教学, 1997 (2) :33-34.

3.文献综述、外文翻译 篇三

0704043046

会计074

唐明婷

中国从资本市场建立开始，上市公司也随之不断地发展，上市的公司从行业、类型到地区、规模都呈现多样化趋势。中国的上市公司，特别是上市公司中的ST公司，存在着严重的财务风险问题，财务风险比较大，对上市公司的发展会有很大的影响。因此对上市公司财务风险问题的研究是十分重要的。通过对这一领域大量文献的研究，从企业财务风险的成因、评价体系及控制三个角度综述，加强分析，以期对上市公司财务风险的理论和实践研究提供借鉴和指导。

（一）国外研究综述

西方古典经济学家在十九世纪就已经提出了风险的概念，认为风险是经营活 动的副产品，经营者的收入是其在经营活动中承担风险的报酬。从狭义上看，企业的财务风险是指由于利用负债给企业带来的破产风险或普通股收益发生大幅度变动的风险。这种观点立足于企业筹资时过多举债或举债不当。西方国家强调全面风险管理的观念是从资金运动到资本经营整个体系的过程，对财务风险的控制包括风险预警、风险识别、危机处理等内容。

美国经济学家富兰克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在1921年出版的(Risk，Uncertainty and Profit)一书中认为：风险是指“可度量的不确定性”。而“不确定性”是指不可度量的风险。风险的特征是概率估计的可靠性，概率估计的可靠性来自所遵循的理论规律或稳定的经验规律。与可计算或可预见的风险不同，不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件的基本知识，对事件可能的结果知之甚少，因此，不能通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析①。

②Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在《Fundamentals of Corporate Finance》提到债务筹资会增加股东的风险，使用债务筹资所产生的这部分额外风险称为公司股 ①

[美] Frank H.Knight,王宇，王文玉译.《风险、不确定性和利润》[M]．中国人民大 学出版社．2005； ② 此段原文如下：“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders.The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity.In other word,financial risk is the equity risk that comes from the financial policy(i.e.capital structure)of the f1rm.”Ross,Westerfield,Jordan,Fundamentals of Corporate Finance,1995 东的财务风险。也就是说，财务风险是指由于公司财务政策(如资本结构)所产生的权益风险。

③James C.Van Horn, John M.Wachowicz Jr(2001)在《Fundamental of Financial Management》里面更宽泛地说明了财务风险包括可能丧失偿债能力的风险，以及由于使用财务杠杆而导致的每股收益变动。

美国学者小阿瑟·威廉姆斯（C.Arthur Willianms)和理查德·M.汉斯（Richard M.Heins)在1985年合著的《Risk Management and Insurance》中将风险定义为：“在给定情况和特定时间内，那些可能发生的结果间的差异。如果肯定只有一个结果发生，则差异为零，风险为零；如果有多种可能结果，则有风险，且差异越大，风险越大。”④这种观点强调，风险是客观存在的事物，可以从客观角度来衡量。

在财务控制方面，国外学者的研究有：美国数学家诺伯特∙维纳1948年创立的控制论；1932年FitzPatrick开展的一元判定研究；Altman在1968年首先创立的zeta模型等。

总体看来，国外财务风险研究起步早，理论体系完善，应用领域广，且研究成果多且系统。如，国外的多家风险管理协会、风险管理学院对企业风险管理事务、专业证书考试制度极具贡献，其中，美国全球风险专业人员协会每年举办财务风险管理人员专业证书考试，多家协会和学会出版风险管理方面的刊物杂志，还出版较多的财务性风险管理书籍等。

（二）国内研究综述

1989年北京商学院的刘恩禄、汤谷良发表的“论财务风险管理”[7]，第一次全面论述了财务风险的定义、特性及财务风险管理的步骤和方法。

财政科学研究所的向德伟博士在1994年发表了“论财务风险”[8]，全面而细致地分析了财务风险产生的原因，认为“财务风险是一种微观风险，是企业经营风险的集中体现”，“企业财务风险，按照财务活动的基本内容来划分，包括筹资风险、投资风险、资金回收风险和收益分配风险四项”，为更深一层推进财务 ③ 此段原文如下：“Broadly speaking,financial risk encompasses both the risk of possible insolvency and the added variability in earnings per share that is induced byt he use of financial leverage.” James C.Van Horne,John M.Wachowicz Jr,Fundamental of Financial Management,2001 ④小阿瑟·威廉姆斯等著，陈伟等译．《风险管理与保险》[M]．中国商业出版社．1990：4； 风险理论奠定了基础。

唐晓云在2000年发表了“略论企业财务风险管理”[9]，认为企业财务风险是指在各项财务活动中，由于各种难以预料或控制的因素的影响，财务状况具有不确定性，从而使企业蒙受损失的可能性。她进一步将财务风险分为筹资风险、投资风险、现金流量风险和外汇风险四种。

以上观点虽然对财务风险的分类不同，但都认为，企业财务风险是因企业财务活动中各种不确定因素的影响，使企业财务收益与预期收益发生偏离，因而造成蒙受损失的机会和可能。企业财务活动的组织和管理过程中的某一方面和某个环节的问题，都可能促使这种风险转变为损失，导致企业盈利能力和偿债能力的降低。这种观点是一种广义观。

胡华在2004年发表了“现代企业财务风险的原因及防范”[10]，认为财务风险的成因是由以下五点构成的：

1．负债经营是财务风险产生最为根本的原因。

2．企业资产流动性弱、现金流量短缺，是财务风险产生的最为直接的原因。3．企业经营不善、投资失误是导致财务风险产生、财务状况恶化最为重要的催化剂。

4．企业资本结构不合理是财务风险产生、财务危机出现最为综合的因素。5．外部环境的多变性是企业财务风险产生的重要外因。

2009年，王宏发表了“浅谈公司财务风险的成因及防范”[11]，认为造成财务风险原因的是以下四个方面：

1．企业财务管理的宏观环境复杂多变,而企业管理系统不能适应复杂多变的宏观环境

2．企业财务管理人员对财务风险的客观性认识不足 3．财务决策缺乏科学性导致决策失误 4．企业内部财务关系不明

根据我国学者们的观点不难推出，分析企业财务风险的成因离不开企业的内外部环境因素的影响，所以本文也将从上市公司的内外部环境来分析财务风险发生的原因。

易晓文（1999）发表了“上市公司财务评价指标体系研究”[12]，作者在文章中对公司财务评价指标体系的内容及指标的选取进行了初步分析、研究。

桂文林,舒晓惠,伍超标（2005）发表了“上市公司财务评价历史分析和展望”[13]，以上市公司财务评价现实意义为前提, 系统地分析了上市公司财务评价指标体系的构建、各种评价方法的比较以及实证研究三项主要内容。并在此基础上, 为进一步发展上市公司财务评价的实证研究提供新的思路。

2009年西北大学的孙金莉发表了“基于企业现金流量的财务预警指标体系研究”[14]，在认真研究了建立企业现金流量财务预警系统的原则和程序，以及建立健全企业现金流量财务预警机制的基础上，构建了企业现金流量财务预警系统。

李季在2010年发表了“上市公司财务危机预警指标研究”[15]，作者认为目前为止国外已开发出若干财务危机评价模型,有的模型在信贷风险评价与管理企业资信评估等实务中已得到广泛应用。而我国对财务危机预警指标仍使用传统的经验范式,因而探索我国企业财务危机预警指标体系对我国经济体制改革深化具有较强理论意义与较紧迫的现实意义。

景红华（2010）发表了“财务困境研究应基于现金流量指标”[16]，认为现金是企业赖以生存的基础，现金流量是企业财务的报警器，企业的生存和发展在很大程度上取决于现金，因此，财务困境研究应基于现金流量指标。

通过阅读大量关于企业财务风险评价体系的相关资料的，了解到，要知道企业财务风险状况如何，必须从偿债能力指标、营运能力指标、盈利能力指标及现金流量风险指标方面来研究。

童宏宾在2004年发表了“企业财务风险成因及控制”[17]，简单地从规避风险、转移风险和提高企业的盈利能力三个方面来对上市公司的财务风险作出控制。

王海翔（2005）发表了“论企业财务风险及其控制”[18]，较全面地从MM理论和期权理论来研究企业财务风险的控制。

吴景杰、施绍梅（2005）发表了“财务风险的控制”[19]，认为在运用理论方法进行财务风险分析时,需要管理人员对具体环境、方法的切合性及某些条件进行合理假设和估计。另外，在采取防范和规避风险的对策时，也必须以规范、科学的管理为基础，否则因使用对策不当反而有可能招致更大的风险。2009年盛九春和叶波二人发表了“现代企业财务风险的防范和控制”[20]，总结了三点防范与控制的措施：

1．完善财务管理系统，提高财务决策的科学化水平2．强化财务风险防范意识，树立正确的财务风险观念 3．建立健全企业财务风险识别与预警系统

孔远英（2010）发表了“关于企业财务风险控制的几点建议”[21]，认为企业发生财务危机是一个逐步显现、缓慢恶化的过程，它的发生具有一定的先兆，因此具有可预测性。为了规避和防范财务风险，企业有必要对财务风险进行充分的认识和分析，及时纠正、改进、并制定相应的对策，有效地完善财务风险预警机制。

我国学者对于财务风险控制问题的解决几乎都离不开规避和防范，观点不一，本本文会在此基础上提出中国上市公司财务风险控制存在的问题及提出对研究有价值的策略。

三、评述与启示

东南亚金融危机以来，国家安全己成为各国关注的焦点之一。国家经济安全必须从防范金融危机、财政危机着手，这已为人们所重视，但人们常忽略金融危机与财政危机的基础是财务危机。财务危机主要表现为公司资本循环周转被打乱而导致的支付危机，它常常潜伏于财务风险之中[12]。

资本市场的繁荣为企业实现跨越式发展提供了无限可能。大型上市公司舞弊的丑闻尚未消散，次贷危机引发的金融海啸又席卷了全球。而此前的短短几年间，我国资本市场迎来了空前繁荣，众多上市公司增发新股，许多尚不具备上市条件的公司也在积极整改包装上市。尽管股市是否出现明显泡沫尚存在争议，但是没有健康的盈利增长，这种繁荣是难以维系的。谋求资本市场的长远发展必须从上市公司的财务风险着手。有效的控制财务风险可以均衡各方利益，规范上市公司行为，使其健康有序的运行。

学者们的研究提高了我们对企业财务风险的重视，并且更有助于我们开拓企业财务风险控制的新思路、新方法，使其在我国企业中得以更好地运用。因狭义的观点明显片面地理解力财务风险，所以，本文将采用广义的财务风险观点，它符合人们对财务概念的理解，便于从更宽广的角度来研究财务风险。希望借鉴国内外先进理论，通过对上市公司财务风险的基本分析, 采用一定的方法, 对财务风险加以控制,以达到企业利益最优的目的。

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[18] 王海翔．论企业财务风险及其控制[D]．首都经济贸易大学．2005﹕13-24； [19] 吴景杰，施绍梅．财务风险的控制[J]．理财杂志．2005(06)﹕32-33；

[20] 盛九春，叶波．现代企业财务风险的防范和控制[J]．财经管理．2009(4)﹕203； [21] 孔远英．关于企业财务风险控制的几点建议[J]．海峡科学．2010(03)；

外文资料

会计074 0704043046 唐明婷

Financial firm bankruptcy and systemic risk

In Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group(AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer.Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps(CDSs).The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, with no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before.Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that firms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result.The concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related firms.This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomic research that financialfirmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies.For example, Bordo and Haubrich(2009)conclude that “...more severe financial events are associated withmore severe recessions...” Likewise, Bernanke(1983)argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment.Bernanke et al.(1999)hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions.This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn.Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonfinancial firms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial firm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S.economy through counterparty risk channels.This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession.Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm files for bankruptcy.Pervasive financial fragility may occur because the failure of one firm leads to the failure of other firms which cascades through the system(e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999;Jarrow and Yu, 2001).Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of financial firms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed(Benston, 1986).In the former case, the failure of one firm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through financial contracts such as CDSs.In the latter case, the fact that so many financial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity(Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak financial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one firm was allowed to file bankruptcy.Further, should one or the other firmgo bankrupt, the nonfinancial firmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of financial firm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators.Foremost among these policies is “too big to fail”(TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large financial institution will have ramifications for other financial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous.TBTF was behind the Fed’s decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P.Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management(LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG.TBTF may be justified if the outcome is prevention of a major downswing in the economy.However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the efficiency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any potential benefits from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off.There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor financial firm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk.Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out.In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely.Thuswewill never knowif themarket downturn that followed the Lehman bankruptcy reflected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems:(1)information contagion,where the information that one financial firmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other financial institutions largely because the firms share common risk factors;or(2)counterparty contagion,where one important financial institution’s collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor firms whose troubles snowball and drive other firms into distress.The efficacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not step in to bail out an individual firm, the alternative is to let it fail.In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the firmare very quickly repaid.In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 filing of a nonfinancial firm.However, if the nonbank financial firm in question has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation(SIPC), the firmis required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act(SIPA)to liquidate under Chapter 7(Don and Wang, 1990).This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman filed for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were not part of the Chapter 11 filing.A major fear of a financial firm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that fire sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed financial firm and that these fire saleswill have ramifications for other firms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed firm(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on financial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets.Thismight have resulted in...[a] fire sale scenario..., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse financial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia)The fear of potential fire sales is expressed in further detail in the same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear...would be forced to file for bankruptcy...[which] would have forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses.If they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured financing to other firms, a much broader liquidity crisis would have ensued.”

The idea that creditors of a failed firm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of U.S.bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control.If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the firm.If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure.Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of fire sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy filing occurs.Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the firm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action.Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S.code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action.This occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays, which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险

2008年秋，当美联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时，这边借给美国国际集团的货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里，而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。在那些大的受益人当中，高盛用12亿美金来撤销美国国际集团的信用违约互换。这一应急方案通过逐步售出美国国际集团的资产来偿还贷款，而不是保住岗位或者是确保短期贷款市场像之前那样持续运转发挥市场效能。因此，政府避免美国国际集团的系统性风险的目的，是为了确保美国国际集团的商业伙伴不至于破产。从这一出发点，很明显是信用违约互换当中最好的一个。也是因为这一点，相比2008年美国国际集团多赢得4000亿的合同。在条款当中，美国政府在援助通用汽车时表现的并没那么积极，可能是因为政府确信，通用的破产把损失强加到相关的合作企业，这样不会对宏观经济产生太大的坏影响。这一决定和宏观经济调查的结果是一致的，即金融公司的破产比非金融公司的破产产生的系统性风险大很多。例如Bordo和 Haubrich提到“越是严重的金融事件越是和严重的经济衰退联系在一起。”同样的，Bernanke反驳道，大萧条如此的让经济衰退是因为银行业的缺陷影响到投资的信用度。Bernanke 假设一种金融加速器机制，在这样的机制中，经济的一个领域破产导致更多的不稳固的资产负债表和紧张的信贷状况。这反过来就导致投资的减少，随之而来的是变少的贷款和普遍的经济衰退。如果对非金融企业的经济冲击都是以破产的形式呈现，这些作者们在辩论经济低迷好似不会很严重的。

我们反而认为非金融企业破产的连锁影响远比金融企业的大，就像美国国际集团。虽然通过竞争对手风险渠道，不会对美国经济产生毁灭性的打击。但并不是说一段时期在大银行间的经济低迷不会伴随冲击很大的经济衰退。只是因为这样是经济失利不会引起经济衰退，也不会影响经济衰退的深度。不管是哪一种类型的企业破产，这样的破产在企业股份中不是常见的导致经济损失的症状。

因为一个公司的倒闭导致其他公司的倒闭形成系统内的一种联级，这样就会产生普遍的经济脆弱的现象。当许多金融公司同时倒闭，系统风险会减弱经济的破坏力度，就像在大萧条时期，9000多家银行倒闭。在前一种案例中，一家公司的倒闭，譬如像美国国际集团，雷曼兄弟，或者贝尔斯登这样的公司倒闭，会导致倒闭现象在金融界蔓延，例如信用违约互换。在后一种案例中，事实是许多金融机构的倒闭意味着不仅仅是货币的供应，而且只要经济活动中的破败，就会降低信用额度。当脆弱的金融系统引起经济的萧条时，经济萧条就不会产生，因为公司可以申请破产。而且如果只是一两个公司的破产，非金融企业会对经济产生更大的影响。

这样极端且真实的影响是金融企业的脆弱性导致调控者特别强调对系统性风险的预防。这些政策当中，最突出的是“太大以至于破产”(TBTF的逻辑)，这一观点的思维方式是，一个大型的金融机构的倒闭将会影响到其分支的金融机构，因此，对经济的风险是很大的。太大而倒闭是2008年随着美国联邦储备委员会决定合并贝尔斯登公司和摩根大通银行之后产生的，在重建银行货代时期的领导是长期资金管理，这一政策的决定是支援美国国际集团。如果结果是阻止了经济的衰退，太大而倒闭的政策将会被证实。然而，如果在这一段时期系统性风险被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益处被高估，资金分配以避免另外一场大萧条的效率代价体系将远远超出任何潜在的利益。

毫无疑问，在观察另外一个系统性风险的时候，没有管理者想乘机撤退。因此当管理者推到一边的时候，我们不能凭经验来考核决定经济状况。当今的美国，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破产的。最近，我们可以看到雷曼兄弟的破产，这是美国联邦储备委员会，逼不得已同意破产的企业。然而，雷曼兄弟的破产是唯一一个显而易见的例子表明太大而倒闭的政策是名不副实的，我们只看到中意政策对系统性风险的微不足道的影响。此外，与此同时因雷曼兄弟的倒闭，此外,与此同时,雷曼兄弟的失败的情况下,美联储正在干预商业市场、促进货币资金,而美国国际集团是跳伞了。而且，美联邦储备局和财政局即将散布第二次大萧条的谣言，以彰显其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我们将永远不知道雷曼兄弟的破产是否会导致市场低迷，以及从雷曼兄弟破产致使人们对破产的恐惧反映到现实的经济上来或者管理者对人们的现实经济体中存在的问题的恐惧进行无限的夸大。

在本论文中，我们分析会引起经济崩溃风险的经济体制。我们关注两种可能引起系统性风险问题的蔓延：（1）信息蔓延，一个金融机构的困境会对其他金融企业产生一系列的消极影响，主要是因为这些企业有许多共同的风险因素。（2）对手蔓延，一个重要的金融机构倒闭直接导致其他信贷机构的危机，这些危机会产生滚雪球效应，引起其他金融企业倒闭。太大而倒闭主义政策的有效性主要依据于这两种系统性风险的控制。对手蔓延会授权干预每一个倒闭的银行，不过信息蔓延就不会。

如果管理者不介入救助某一企业，要不就是任其倒闭。例如一家银行，处理的过程包括以美国联邦储蓄保险公司作为其产业管理人，使其担保的债务在很短的时间里还清。相反，如果破产的是一个投资银行或者是对冲基金没有参与美国联邦储蓄保险公司，这可能是很像第11章和第7章那样的非金融企业。然而，我们所说的非金融企业的债务是由证券行业保护公司承担的，这样的企业是要遵守证券行业保护法令的条例的第7章来停止经济活动。这在很大程度上解释了2008年为什么雷曼兄弟的持股公司申请破产其证券交易子公司不在第11章的备案里面。

对金融企业破产停止运行最大的忧虑在于，减价出售致使倒闭和企业债权人对企业复苏的绝望，这样的减价出售还会使相关联的企业具有负面影响，即便这些企业和倒闭的企业没有直接的关系，不论是否经过美国联邦储蓄保险公司还是被证券行业保护法令所规定的。这些担忧都是由于在2008年3月联邦储备委员会决定扩大停产决定到初级证券交易人。联邦储备委员会的主席在一次关于经济系统稳定性的演讲中说：“形成的风险就是停产的压力可能迫使交易者们变卖财产到不动产市场。这就将导致低价出售的情形。并且金融市场的普遍低迷和运用的停止将会对资产的价格产生很到的影响，对金融和经济都会产生不良影响。”（2008年5月13日在乔治亚州，联邦储蓄银行亚特南大海岛会议上的演讲。）

对低价销售的恐惧也反映在后来同样的对于贝尔斯登和摩根大通现象出现的原因的演讲里面：“熊市„迫使申请破产„这样的状况会迫使熊市的稳固的债权人和竞争对手来制止潜在的倒闭的可能性，如果市场的流通性不足，这些债权人和竞争对手将要承担损失。如果他们对于其资产的损失和突如其来的流动性不足，是通过撤资投资到其他有保障的金融业里面，这样一来，更大的资金流动危机将接踵而来。”

一个倒闭企业的债权人被迫匆匆冻结资产，这是有悖于美国破产法的基本信条的。美国破产法是让债权人能够使其名下的财产达到最大价值。如果在操作过程中达到最大值，法律就会允许该企业重组。如果在价值在停产之后变更高，破产法是绝不会干扰资产的有序变卖。破产其实是减少低价甩卖的可能性，因为资产不是在申请破产批下来之后立即可以变卖的。

4.外文翻译 篇四

华立学院

本科毕业设计（论文）

外文参考文献译文及原文

系 部 会计学部

专 业 会计学

年 级 级

班级名称

学 号

学生姓名

指导教师

年 5 月

目 录

1 外文文献译文 .......................................................... 1

2 外文文献原文 .......................................................... 9

2 内部环境

【本章摘要】内部环境包含组织的基调，它影响组织中人员的风险意识，是企业风险管理所有其他构成要素的基础，为其他要素提供约束和结构。内部环境因素包括主体的风险管理理念、它的风险容量、董事会的监督、主体中人员的诚信、道德价值观和胜任能力，以及管理当局分配权力和职责、组织和开发其员工的方式。

内部环境是企业风险管理所有其他构成要素的基础，为其他要素提供约束和结构。它影响着战略和目标如何制订、经营活动如何组织以及如何识别、评估风险并采取行动。它还影响着控制活动、信息与沟通体系和监控措施的设计与运行。

内部环境受到主体的历史和文化的影响。它包含许多要素，包括主体的道德价值观、员工的胜任能力和开发、管理当局管理风险的理念以及如何分配权力和职责。董事会是内部环境的一个关键部分，它对其他的内部环境要素有重大的影响。

尽管所有要素都很重要，但是对每个要素的强调程度会因主体而异。举例来说，一家员工较少、专注化经营的公司的首席执行官可能就不会制订正式的职责划分和具体的经营政策。但是，这家公司也会有为企业风险管理提供合适基础的内部环境。

风险管理理念

一个主体的风险管理理念是一整套共同的信念和态度，它决定着该主体在做任何事情――从战略制订和执行到日常的活动――时如何考虑风险。风险管理理念反映了主体的价值观，影响它的文化和经营风格，并且决定如何应用企业风险管理的构成要素，包括如何识别风险，承担哪些风险，以及如何管理这些风险。

成功地承担了重大风险的公司对企业风险管理的看法，似乎不同于由于在危险的地区创业而面临过严酷的经济或管制后果的公司。尽管有些主体会为了满足外部利益相关者――例如母公司或监管者的需要，而努力实现有效的企业风险管理，但是更常见的是因为管理当局认识到有效的风险管理有助于主体创造和保持价值。

当风险管理理念被很好地确立和理解、并且为员工所信奉时，主体就能有效地识别和管理风险。否则，企业风险管理在各个业务单元、职能机构或部门中的应用就可能会出现不可接受的不平衡状态。但是即使一个主体的理念被很好地确

立，在它的各个单元之间仍然会存在文化上的差别，从而导致风险管理应用方面的差异。一些单元的管理者可能准备承担更大的风险，而其他的则更为保守。例如，一个有闯劲的销售职能机构可能会集中关注实现销售，而没有仔细注意对法规的遵循问题，而缔约单元的人员主要集中关注确保符合所有的相关内部和外部政策与法规。孤立地看，这些不同的次级文化都能对主体产生负面影响。但是通过很好的合作，这些单元能够恰当地反映主体的风险管理理念。

企业的风险管理理念实质上反映在管理当局在经营该主体的过程中所做的每一件事情上。它可以从政策表述、口头和书面的沟通以及决策中反映出来。无论管理当局是强调书面的政策、行为准则、业绩指标和例外报告，还是更为非正式地大量通过与关键的管理者面对面的接触来进行运营，至关重要的是管理当局不仅要通过口头、而且还要通过日常的行动来强化这种理念。

风险容量

风险容量是一个主体在追求价值的过程中所愿意承担的广泛意义上的风险的数量。它反映了企业的风险管理理念，进而影响了主体的文化和经营风格。

风险容量在战略制订的过程中加以考虑，来自一项战略的期望报酬应该与主体的风险容量相协调。不同的战略会使主体面临不同程度的风险，应用于战略制订过程的企业风险管理帮助管理当局选择一个与主体的风险容量相一致的战略。

主体运用类似高、适中或低等类别，从质的角度考虑风险容量，或者运用数量化的方法，来反映和平衡增长、报酬和风险方面的目标。

董事会

一个主体的董事会是内部环境的关键部分，它对其要素有着重大影响。董事会对于管理当局的独立性、其成员的经验和才干、对活动参与和审察的程度，以及其行为的适当性都起着重要的作用。其他因素包括提出有关战略、计划和业绩方面的疑难问题和与管理当局进行商讨的程度，以及董事会或审计委员会与内部和外部审计师的交流。

一个积极的和高度参与型的董事会、托管委员会（board of trustees）或类似的机构，应该具有适当程度的管理、技术和其他专长，以及履行监督职责所需要

的思维方式。这对于一个有效的企业风险管理环境至关重要。而且，由于董事会必须准备去质疑和仔细审查管理当局的活动，提出不同的观点，并针对不当行为采取行动，因此董事会必须包含外部董事。

高层管理当局的成员可能带来他们对公司的深入了解，从而成为有效的董事会成员。但是必须有足够数量的独立外部董事，他们不但要提供合理的建议、咨询和指导，而且还要对管理当局形成必要的牵制和制衡。要想使内部环境有效，董事会中的独立外部董事必须至少占多数。

有效的董事会能确保管理当局保持有效的风险管理。尽管一家企业在过去可能没有遭受损失、没有暴露出明显的重大风险，董事会也不能天真地认定带有严重负面后果的事项“在这里不会发生”。应该认识到，尽管一家公司可能有合理的战略、胜任的员工、合理的经营流程和可靠的技术，但是它和所有的主体一样，对于风险而言都很脆弱，因此也需要有效运行的风险管理。

诚信与道德价值观

主体的战略和目标以及它们得以推行的方式建立在偏好、价值判断和管理风格的基础之上。管理当局的诚信和对道德价值观的要求影响这些转化为行为准则的偏好和判断。因为一个主体的良好声誉是如此有价值，所以行为的准则应该不仅仅只是遵循法律。经营良好的企业的管理者越来越接受这样的观点，那就是道德是值得的，道德行为就是良好的经营。

管理当局的诚信是一个主体活动的所有方面的道德行为的先决条件。企业风险管理的有效性不可能脱离那些创造、管理和监督主体活动的人的诚信和道德价值观。诚信和道德价值观是一个主体内部环境的关键要素，它影响着企业风险管理其他构成要素的设计、管理和监控。

树立道德价值观通常很困难，因为需要考虑多个方面的利益。管理当局的价值观必须平衡企业、员工、供应商、客户、竞争者和公众的利益。平衡这些利益可能是复杂而令人沮丧的，因为利益通常是互相矛盾的。举例来说，提供一种必需的产品（石油、木材或食品）可能会导致环境方面的关切。

道德行为和管理当局的诚信是公司文化的副产品，公司文化包含道德和行为准则以及它们的沟通和强化方式。正式的政策指明了董事会和管理当局希望发生

的情况。公司文化决定着实际发生的情况，以及哪些规则被遵循、扭曲或忽视了。高层管理当局――从CEO开始――在确定公司文化方面起着关键作用。作为主体中的居于支配地位的人员，CEO往往确定了道德基调。

特定的组织因素也会影响出现欺诈性和可疑的财务报告行为的可能性。这些因素可能还会影响道德行为。个人可能会因为主体给了他们这么做的强烈动机或诱惑，而参与不诚实的、非法的或不道德的行为。过分地强调结果，尤其是短期结果，可能会造成一个不恰当的内部环境。仅仅关注短期结果即使在短期也可能有危害。专注于底线――不顾成本的销售收入或利润――通常会引发不希望看到的行动和反应。例如，高压销售策略、谈判的残酷或者对回扣的暗示可能会引发具有即期（以及持久）影响的反应。

参与欺诈性和可疑的财务报告行为以及其他形式的不道德行为的其他动机可能包括高度依赖于所报告的财务或非财务信息――尤其是短期结果――的报酬。

从消除或减少不恰当的动机和诱惑到消除不良行为之间要走一段很长的路。就像所建议的那样，它可以通过从事合理而又有利可图的经营活动来实现。例如，只要业绩目标切合实际，业绩激励――配以适当的控制――就能成为一个有用的管理技术。设定切合实际的目标是一项正确的激励措施，它能降低产生相反作用的压力，以及欺诈性报告的动机。同样地，一个控制良好的报告体系能够起到防止错报业绩诱惑的作用。

可疑行为的另一个原因是忽视。道德价值观不仅必须沟通，而且必须辅以关于是非对错的明确指南。正式的公司行为守则对有效的道德项目十分重要，是它的基础。守则致力于一系列的行为问题，例如诚信与道德、利益冲突、不合法或不恰当的支付以及反竞争的（anticompetitive）协议等。向上沟通的渠道也很重要，它带来相关信息并使员工感到舒服。

仅仅有书面的行为守则、员工接受和理解的文件和适当的沟通渠道，还不能确保守则被遵守。对违反守则的员工所给予的处罚，鼓励员工报告所怀疑的违反行为的机制，以及针对知情而不报告违反行为的员工的惩戒措施，对于遵守守则而言也很重要。但是如果不能通过高层管理当局的行为和他们所作的表率提供更有效的保证的话，无论道德准则是否包含在书面的守则之中，对道德准则的遵守

都没有什么区别。对于是非对错――以及对于风险与控制，员工可能会形成与高层管理当局所表现出来的一样的态度。管理当局的行为所传达的信息很快就会被包含到公司文化之中。而且，有关CEO在面临一个艰难的.经营决策时从道德的角度讲“做了正确的事情”的认识，能够在整个主体中传达一个强有力的信息。 对胜任能力的要求

胜任能力反映实现规定的任务所需要的知识和技能。管理当局通过在主体的战略和目标与它们的执行和实现计划之间进行权衡，来决定这些任务应该完成到什么程度。通常会存在能力与成本之间的权衡，比如说，没有必要去雇用一个电气工程师来更换灯泡。

管理当局明确特定岗位的胜任能力水平，并把这些水平转换成所需的知识和技能。而这些必要的知识和技能可能又取决于个人的智力、培训和经验。在开发知识和技能水平的过程中所考虑的因素包括一个具体岗位所运用判断的性质和程度。通常会在监督的范围和所需的胜任能力水平之间作出权衡。

组织结构

一个主体的组织结构提供了计划、执行、控制和监督其活动的框架。相关的组织结构包括确定权力与责任的关键界区，以及确立恰当的报告途径。举例来说，内部审计职能机构的结构设计应该致力于实现组织的目标，并且允许不受限制地与高层管理当局和董事会的审计委员会接触，而且首席审计官应当向组织中能保证内部审计活动实现其职责的层级报告工作。

主体建立适合其需要的组织结构。有的是集权型的，有的是分权型的。有的有着直接报告关系，而其他的则更接近于矩阵型组织。一些主体按照行业或产品线、按照地理位置或者按照特定的配送或营销网络来进行组织。而其他的主体，包括很多州和地方政府单位以及非营利机构，则按照职能进行组织。

一个主体的组织结构的适当性部分地取决于它的规模和所从事活动的性质。有着正式的报告途径和职责的高度结构化的组织，可能适合于拥有很多经营分部、包括外国业务的大型主体。然而，在一家小公司中，这种结构可能会阻碍必要的信息流动。不管采取什么样的结构，主体的组织方式都应该确保有效的企业

风险管理，并采取行动以便实现其目标。

权力和职责的分配

权力和职责的分配涉及到个人和团队被授权并鼓励发挥主动性去指出问题和解决问题的程度，以及对他们的权力的限制。它包括确立报告关系和授权规程，以及描述恰当经营活动的政策，关键人员的知识和经验，和为履行职责而赋予的资源。

一些主体将权力下放，以便使决策更接近于一线的人员。公司可以采取这种方式而变得更具市场驱动的特点，或者更关注质量――或许是消除缺陷、缩短周转时间或者提高客户满意度。通常通过将权力与受托责任（accountability）相结合来鼓励个人在限定的范围内发挥主动性。权力的委派意味着将特定经营决策的核心控制权交给较低的层级――给那些更靠近日常经营业务的人员。这可能包括授权以折扣价格销售产品，商谈长期供货合同、许可或专利，或者参加联盟或合营企业。

一个关键的挑战是仅仅针对实现目标所需要的范围来进行授权。这意味着确保决策是基于合理的风险识别和评估活动，包括在确定接受何种风险以及如何对它们加以管理的过程中，估计风险的大小和权衡潜在的损失与收益。

另一个挑战是确保所有的人员都了解主体的目标。每个人都知道他们的行为彼此之间有什么关联和对实现目标有什么作用，是至关重要的。

增加授权有时候有意伴随着组织结构的简化或“扁平化”，或者是其结果。为激发创造性、发挥主动性和加快反应速度而开展的有意识的组织变革，能够提高竞争力和客户满意度。这种增加授权可能会带来对更高的员工胜任能力水平以及更大的受托责任的隐含要求。它还要求管理当局采用有效的程序对结果进行监控，从而使决策能够根据需要被否决或接受。有了更好的、市场驱动的决策，授权能够增加非期望或非预期决策的数量。例如，如果一个区域销售经理决定授权在零售价的基础上折让35%来进行销售，以证实目前45%的折扣能够获取市场份额，管理当局可能需要了解情况才能否决或者接受让这种决策进行下去。

内部环境极大地受到个人对他们将要承担责任的认识程度的影响。对于首席执行官而言，也是如此，他在董事会的监督下对主体内部的所有活动负有终极责

任。

与有效的企业风险管理密不可分的各个方面的职能与责任的其他相关原则，将在“职能与责任”那一章中展开讲述。

人力资源准则

包括雇用、定位、培训、评价、咨询、晋升、付酬和采取补偿措施在内的人力资源业务向员工传达着有关诚信、道德行为和胜任能力的期望水平方面的信息。例如，强调教育背景、前期工作经验、过去的成就和有关诚信和道德行为的证据，以便雇用资质最好的个人的准则，表明了一个主体对胜任和可信任人员的承诺。当招录活动中包括正式的、深入的招聘面试和有关该主体的历史、文化和经营风格方面的培训时，也是如此。

培训政策能够通过对未来职能与责任的沟通，以及包含诸如培训学校和研习班、模拟案例研究和扮演角色练习等活动，来加强业绩和行为的期望水平。根据定期业绩评价所进行的调换与晋升，反映了主体对于提升合格员工的承诺。包括分红激励在内的竞争性的报酬计划能够起到鼓励和强化突出业绩的作用――尽管奖金制度应该严密并且有效地控制，以避免对报告结果的不实呈报产生不当的诱惑。惩戒行动所传递的信息则是对期望行为的偏离将不会得到宽宥。

随着贯穿于主体之中的问题和风险的变化和愈加复杂――部分原因在于急剧变革的技术和日益激烈的竞争，很有必要把员工武装起来以应对新的挑战。教育和培训，不管是课堂讲授、自学还是在职培训，都必须有助于个人跟上环境变革的步伐并能有效地应对。雇用胜任的人员和提供一次性培训是不够的。教育过程是持续的。

影响

一个主体内部环境的重要性和它对企业风险管理的其他构成要素所能产生的正面或负面影响，怎么强调都不过分。一个无效的内部环境的影响会很广泛，可能会导致财务损失、损害公众形象，或经营失败。

一般认为某能源公司有着有效的企业风险管理，因为它有强有力而受人尊敬的高层管理者、声望卓著的董事会、富有创新意识的战略、设计良好的信息系统

和控制活动、描述风险和控制职能的广泛的政策手册，以及全面的调整和监督途径。但是，它的内部环境却有重大缺陷。管理当局参与了十分可疑的经营业务，而董事会却视而不见。这家公司被发现曾经误报财务成果，损害了股东信心，遭遇了偿债危机，毁灭了主体的价值。最终这家公司陷入了历史上最大的破产案之一。

高层管理当局对有效企业风险管理的态度和关注必须明确而清晰，并渗透到组织之中。光说得正确是不够的。那种“按我说的去做，而不是按我做的去做”的态度，只会带来一个无效的环境。

2. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Chapter Summary: The internal

environment encompasses the tone of an

organization, influencing the risk consciousness

of its people, and is the basis for all other

components of enterprise risk management,

providing discipline and structure. Internal

environment factors include an entity’s risk

management philosophy; its risk appetite;

oversight by the board of directors; the integrity,

ethical values, and competence of the entity’s people; and the way management assigns authority and responsibility, and organizes and develops its people.

The internal environment is the basis for all other components of enterprise risk management, providing discipline and structure. It influences how strategies and objectives are established, business activities are structured, and risks are identified, assessed, and acted upon. And it influences the design and functioning of control activities, information and communication systems, and monitoring activities.

The internal environment is influenced by an entity’s history and culture. It comprises many elements, including the entity’s ethical values, competence and development of personnel, management’s philosophy for managing risk, and how it assigns authority and responsibility. A board of directors is a critical part of the internal environment and significantly influences other internal environment elements.

Although all elements are important, the extent to which each is addressed will vary with the entity. For example, the chief executive of a company with a small workforce and centralized operations might not establish formal lines of responsibility and detailed operating policies. Nevertheless, the company could have an internal

environment that provides an appropriate foundation for enterprise risk management.

Risk Management Philosophy

An entity’s risk management philosophy is the set of shared beliefs and attitudes characterizing how the entity considers risk in everything it does, from strategy development and implementation to its day-to-day activities. Its risk management philosophy reflects the entity’s values, influencing its culture and operating style, and affects how enterprise risk management components are applied, including how risks are identified, the kinds of risks accepted, and how they are managed.

A company that has been successful accepting significant risks is likely to have a different outlook on enterprise risk management than one that has faced harsh economic or regulatory consequences as a result of venturing into dangerous territory. While some entities may work to achieve effective enterprise risk management to satisfy requirements of an external stakeholder, such as a parent company or regulator, more often it is because management recognizes that effective risk management helps the entity create and preserve value.

When the risk management philosophy is well developed, understood, and embraced by its personnel, the entity is positioned to effectively recognize and manage risk. Otherwise, there can be unacceptably uneven application of enterprise risk management across business units, functions, or departments. But even when an entity’s philosophy is well developed, there nonetheless may be cultural differences among its units, resulting in variation in enterprise risk management application. Managers of some units may be prepared to take more risk, while others are more conservative. For example, an aggressive selling function may focus its attention on making a sale, without careful attention to regulatory compliance matters, while the contracting unit’s personnel focus significant attention on ensuring compliance with all relevant internal and external policies and regulations. Separately, these different subcultures could adversely affect the entity. But by working well together the units can appropriately reflect the entity’s risk management philosophy.

The enterprise’s risk management philosophy is reflected in virtually everything management does in running the entity. It is captured in policy statements, oral and

written communications, and decision making. Whether management emphasizes written policies, standards of behavior, performance indicators, and exception reports, or operates more informally largely through face-to-face contact with key managers, of critical importance is that management reinforces the philosophy not only with words but also with everyday actions.

Risk Appetite

Risk appetite is the amount of risk, on a broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value. It reflects the enterprise’s risk management philosophy, and in turn influences the entity’s culture and operating style.

Risk appetite is considered in strategy setting, where the desired return from a strategy should be aligned with the entity’s risk appetite. Different strategies will expose the entity to different levels of risk, and enterprise risk management, applied in strategy setting, helps management select a strategy consistent with the entity’s risk appetite.

Entities consider risk appetite qualitatively, with such categories as high, moderate, or low, or take a quantitative approach, reflecting and balancing goals for growth and return with risk.

Board of Directors

An entity’s board of directors is a critical part of the internal environment and significantly influences its elements. The board’s independence from management, experience and stature of its members, extent of its involvement and scrutiny of activities, and appropriateness of its actions all play a role. Other factors include the degree to which difficult questions are raised and pursued with management regarding strategy, plans, and performance, and interaction the board or audit committee has with internal and external auditors.

An active and involved board of directors, board of trustees, or comparable body should possess an appropriate degree of management, technical, and other expertise,

coupled with the mind-set necessary to perform its oversight responsibilities. This is critical to an effective enterprise risk management environment. And, because the board must be prepared to question and scrutinize management’s activities, present alternative views, and act in the face of wrongdoing, the board must include outside directors.

Members of top management may be effective board members, bringing their deep knowledge of the company. But there must be a sufficient number of independent outside directors not only to provide sound advice, counsel, and direction, but also to serve as a necessary check and balance on management. For the internal environment to be effective, the board must have at least a majority of independent outside directors.

Effective boards of directors ensure that management maintains effective risk management. Although an enterprise historically might have not suffered losses and have no obvious significant risk exposure, the board does not succumb to the mythical notion that events with seriously adverse consequences “couldn’t happen here.” It recognizes that while a company may have a sound strategy, competent employees, sound business processes, and reliable technology, it, like every entity, is vulnerable to risk, and an effectively functioning risk management process is needed.

Integrity and Ethical Values

An entity’s strategy and objectives and the way they are implemented are based on preferences, value judgments, and management styles. Management’s integrity and commitment to ethical values influence these preferences and judgments, which are translated into standards of behavior. Because an entity’s good reputation is so valuable, the standards of behavior must go beyond mere compliance with law. Managers of well-run enterprises increasingly have accepted the view that ethics pays and ethical behavior is good business.

Management integrity is a prerequisite for ethical behavior in all aspects of an entity’s activities. The effectiveness of enterprise risk management cannot rise above

the integrity and ethical values of the people who create, administer, and monitor entity activities. Integrity and ethical values are essential elements of an entity’s internal environment, affecting the design, administration, and monitoring of other enterprise risk management components.

Establishing ethical values often is difficult because of the need to consider the concerns of several parties. Management values must balance the concerns of the enterprise, employees, suppliers, customers, competitors, and the public. Balancing these concerns can be complex and frustrating because interests are often at odds. For example, providing an essential product (petroleum, lumber, or food) may cause environmental concerns.

Ethical behavior and management integrity are by-products of the corporate culture, which encompasses ethical and behavioral standards and how they are communicated and reinforced. Official policies specify what the board and management want to happen. Corporate culture determines what actually happens, and which rules are obeyed, bent, or ignored. Top management C starting with the CEO C plays a key role in determining the corporate culture. As the dominant personality in an entity, the CEO often sets the ethical tone.

Certain organizational factors also can influence the likelihood of fraudulent and questionable financial reporting practices. Those same factors are likely to influence ethical behavior as well. Individuals may engage in dishonest, illegal, or unethical acts simply because the entity gives them strong incentives or temptations to do so. Undue emphasis on results, particularly in the short term, can foster an inappropriate internal environment. Focusing solely on short- term results can hurt even in the short term. Concentration on the bottom line C sales or profit at any cost C often evokes unsought actions and reactions. High-pressure sales tactics, ruthlessness in negotiations, or implicit offers of kickbacks, for instance, may evoke reactions that can have immediate (as well as lasting) effects.

Other incentives for engaging in fraudulent or questionable reporting practices and, by extension, other forms of unethical behavior may include rewards highly dependent on reported financial and non-financial information, particularly for

short-term results.

Removing or reducing inappropriate incentives and temptations goes a long way toward eliminating undesirable behavior. As suggested, this can be achieved by following sound and profitable business practices. For example, performance incentives C accompanied by appropriate controls C can be a useful management technique as long as the performance targets are realistic. Setting realistic targets is a sound motivational practice, reducing counterproductive stress as well as the incentive for fraudulent reporting. Similarly, a well- controlled reporting system can serve as a safeguard against temptation to misstate performance.

Another cause of questionable practices is ignorance. Ethical values must be not only communicated but also accompanied by explicit guidance regarding what is right and wrong.

Formal codes of corporate conduct are important to and the foundation of an effective ethics program. Codes address a variety of behavioral issues, such as integrity and ethics, conflicts of interest, illegal or otherwise improper payments, and anticompetitive arrangements. Upward communications channels where employees feel comfortable bringing relevant information also are important.

Existence of a written code of conduct, documentation that employees received and understand it, and an appropriate communications channel by themselves do not ensure the code is being followed. Also important to compliance are resulting penalties to employees who violate the code, mechanisms that encourage employee reporting of suspected violations, and disciplinary actions against employees who knowingly fail to report violations. But compliance with ethical standards, whether or not embodied in a written code, is equally if not more effectively ensured by top management’s actions and the examples they set. Employees are likely to develop the same attitudes about right and wrong C and about risks and controls C as those shown by top management. Messages sent by management’s actions quickly become embodied in the corporate culture. And, knowledge that the CEO has “done the right thing” ethically when faced with a tough business decision, sends a powerful message throughout the entity.

Commitment to Competence

Competence reflects the knowledge and skills needed to perform assigned tasks. Management decides how well these tasks need to be accomplished, weighing the entity’s strategy and objectives against plans for their implementation and achievement. A trade-off often exists between competence and cost C it is not necessary, for instance, to hire an electrical engineer to change a light bulb.

Management specifies the competency levels for particular jobs and translates those levels into requisite knowledge and skills. The necessary knowledge and skills in turn may depend on individuals’ intelligence, training, and experience. Factors considered in developing knowledge and skill levels include the nature and degree of judgment to be applied to a specific job. Often a trade-off can be made between the extent of supervision and the requisite competence level of the individual.

Organizational Structure

An entity’s organizational structure provides the framework to plan, execute, control, and monitor its activities. A relevant organizational structure includes defining key areas of authority and responsibility and establishing appropriate lines of reporting. For example, an internal audit function should be structured in a manner that achieves organizational objectivity and permits unrestricted access to top management and the audit committee of the board, and the chief audit executive should report to a level within the organization that allows the internal audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities.

An entity develops an organizational structure suited to its needs. Some are centralized, others decentralized. Some have direct reporting relationships, while others are more of a matrix organization. Some entities are organized by industry or product line, by geographical location or by a particular distribution or marketing network. Other entities, including many state and local governmental units and not-for-profit institutions, are organized by function.

The appropriateness of an entity’s organizational structure depends, in part, on its

size and the nature of its activities. A highly structured organization with formal reporting lines and responsibilities may be appropriate for a large entity that has numerous operating divisions, including foreign operations. However, such a structure could impede the necessary flow of information in a small company. Whatever the structure, an entity should be organized to enable effective enterprise risk management and to carry out its activities so as to achieve its objectives.

Assignment of Authority and Responsibility

Assignment of authority and responsibility involves the degree to which individuals and teams are authorized and encouraged to use initiative to address issues and solve problems, as well as limits to their authority. It includes establishing reporting relationships and authorization protocols, as well as policies that describe appropriate business practices, knowledge and experience of key personnel, and resources provided for carrying out duties.

Some entities have pushed authority downward to bring decision making closer to front-line personnel. A company may take this tack to become more market-driven or quality-focused C perhaps to eliminate defects, reduce cycle time, or increase customer satisfaction. Alignment of authority and accountability often is designed to encourage individual initiatives, within limits. Delegation of authority means surrendering central control of certain business decisions to lower echelons C to the individuals who are closest to everyday business transactions. This may involve empowerment to sell products at discount prices; negotiate long-term supply contracts, licenses, or patents; or enter alliances or joint ventures.

A critical challenge is to delegate only to the extent required to achieve objectives. This means ensuring that decision making is based on sound practices for risk identification and assessment, including sizing risks and weighing potential losses versus gains in determining which risks to accept and how they are to be managed.

Another challenge is ensuring that all personnel understand the entity’s objectives. It is essential that individuals know how their actions are related to one

another and contribute to achievement of the objectives.

Increased delegation sometimes is intentionally accompanied by or the result of streamlining or “flattening” the organizational structure. Purposeful structural change to encourage creativity, taking initiative, and faster response times can enhance competitiveness and cu外文翻译范文stomer satisfaction. This increased delegation may carry an implicit requirement for a higher level of employee competence, as well as greater accountability. It also requires effective procedures for management to monitor results so that decisions can be overruled or accepted as necessary. Along with better, market-driven decisions, delegation may increase the number of undesirable or unanticipated decisions. For example, if a district sales manager decides that authorization to sell at 35% off list price justifies a temporary 45% discount to gain market share, management may need to know so that it can overrule or accept such decisions going forward.

The internal environment is greatly influenced by the extent to which individuals recognize that they will be held accountable. This holds true all the way to the chief executive, who, with board oversight, has ultimate responsibility for all activities within an entity.

Additional principles related to roles and responsibilities by parties integral to effective enterprise risk management are set forth in the Roles and Responsibilities chapter.

Human Resource Standards

Human resource practices pertaining to hiring, orientation, training, evaluating, counseling, promoting, compensating, and taking remedial actions send messages to employees regarding expected levels of integrity, ethical behavior, and competence. For example, standards for hiring the most qualified individuals, with emphasis on educational background, prior work experience, past accomplishments, and evidence of integrity and ethical behavior, demonstrate an entity’s commitment to competent and trustworthy people. The same is true when recruiting practices include formal,

in-depth employment interviews and training in the entity’s history, culture, and operating style.

Training policies can reinforce expected levels of performance and behavior by communicating prospective roles and responsibilities and by including such practices as training schools and seminars, simulated case studies, and role-playing exercises. Transfers and promotions driven by periodic performance appraisals demonstrate the entity’s commitment to advancement of qualified employees. Competitive compensation programs that include bonus incentives serve to motivate and reinforce outstanding performance C although reward systems should be structured, and controls in place, to avoid undue temptation to misrepresent reported results. Disciplinary actions send a message that violations of expected behavior will not be tolerated.

It is essential that employees be equipped to tackle new challenges as issues and risks throughout the entity change and become more complex C driven in part by rapidly changing technologies and increasing competition. Education and training, whether classroom instruction, self-study, or on-the-job training, must help personnel keep pace and deal effectively with the evolving environment. Hiring competent people and providing one-time training are not enough. The education process is ongoing.

Implications

It is difficult to overstate the importance of an entity’s internal environment and the impact C positive or negative C it can have on other enterprise risk management components. The impact of an ineffective internal environment can be far-reaching, possibly resulting in financial loss, a tarnished public image, or a business failure.

An energy company generally was thought to have effective enterprise risk management since it had high-powered and respected senior managers, a prestigious board of directors, an innovative strategy, well-designed information systems and control activities, extensive policy manuals prescribing risk and control functions, and

comprehensive reconciling and supervisory routines. Its internal environment, however, was significantly flawed.

Management participated in highly questionable business practices, and the board turned a “blind-eye.” The company was found to have misreported financial results and suffered a loss of shareholder confidence, a liquidity crisis, and destruction of entity value. Ultimately the company went into one of the largest bankruptcies in history.

The attitude and concern of top management for effective enterprise risk management must be definitive and clear, and permeate the organization. It is not sufficient to say the right words. An attitude of “do as I say, not as I do” will only bring about an ineffective environment.

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